

guidance is really more like a directive. In the context of sub-national administration, we can find the general guidance carried out by the DDN, technical guidance carried out by the technical departments and the operational guidance of the *Kepala Daerah* vis-a-vis the *instansi vertikal*.

10. However, the autonomy of the village to chose its head is limited by the mandatory screening of candidates by the higher levels of administration (Warren 1990:2).
11. The PBB (*Pajak Bumi dan Bangunan* - Land and Building Tax) is shared between the central government (10 percent), the provincial government (9 percent) and the Dati II government (81 percent) (Supriatna 1993:179).
12. 70 percent of the license fees and 60 percent of the royalties are assigned to the provincial governments, 20 percent of these royalties are given to the Dati II governments (Davey 1989:172).
13. Under the general INPRES scheme, the provincial governments receive a minimum grant of 12 billion Rp. plus -since 1990/91- additional assistance according to their territorial size (GOI 1994: 753). The allocations to the Dati II governments are based on a per capita allocation of Rp. 5000 per inhabitant, but with a guaranteed minimum allocation of Rp. 1 billion for each Dati II (ibid:761). Villages receive a grant allocation of Rp 5.5 million (ibid:769).
14. Kastorius Sinaga, Doubts mar regional autonomy project, *Jakarta Post* 6 April 1995.
15. *Jakarta Post* 9 March 1995.
16. *Jakarta Post* 28 February 1995.
17. See *Jakarta Post* 11 April 1995: "Autonomy program to go ahead".
18. Kastorius Sinaga, Doubts mar regional autonomy project. *Jakarta Post* 6 April 1995.
19. So the political scientist Amir Santoso, *Jakarta Post*, 4 January 1994.

4

The Indonesian civil service

The Indonesian citizen as well as the visitor from abroad (be it a long-term "expatriate" or a short-term tourist going to Bali) experiences the system of public administration in Indonesia through encounters and contacts with the people working in this system: the civil servants (*pegawai negeri sipil* - PNS).⁽¹⁾ Be it the customs officer at the airport who is checking the luggage of incoming visitors, the policeman directing the traffic in Jakarta's "Three-in-one"-zone, the local government official issuing the national identity card (*kartu tanda penduduk* - KTP) or the tax officer receiving the annual tax statement - the image and perception of a public administration, of its quality and its efficiency, its character and its esteem is determined by these personal contacts with an otherwise abstract and anonymous system. In the previous chapters we looked at the legal background and at the formal structure of the public administration at central and regional level, and at its procedures, programmes and working mechanisms. In this chapter, we will look at the human component of the public administration, the people working in the system. We will describe the size, structure and composition of the civil service, the distribution of civil servants between central and regional governments, the existing working culture, the institutional arrangements for the administration of the civil service, at recruitment, training and career patterns, and at efforts to reform and modernise the civil service in order to increase productivity, efficiency and responsiveness.

4.1 Structure and size of the Indonesian civil service

At the end of the Dutch colonial rule, around 50,000 persons were employed in the civil service, with only a small portion of Indonesians occupying senior positions (Bintoro 1991:75). The number of civil servants increased drastically after Indonesia gained her independence: in 1950 the civil service employed around 303,500 persons, in 1960 around 393,000. The number of civil servants per 1,000 inhabitants increased from an estimated 1.1 in 1940 to 3.7 in 1950 and 4.1 in 1960. The second large increase in the number of civil servants came in the 1970s, when increased revenue from oil allowed the government to expand its scope of activities. From around 525,000 in 1970 the number of civil servants increased to more than 2 million in 1980, calculated per 1,000 inhabitants the number increased

from 4.4 to 13.9 during the same period (all figures from Evers/Schiel 1988:236). From 1986 to 1992, the civil service grew by 25 percent,⁽²⁾ with a significant lower growth rate in the latter years of this period. The number of civil service reached its peak in 1993 with slightly more than 4 million positions, or 21.8 civil servants per 1,000 inhabitants.

Table 9: Growth of the civil service (1950 -1992)

Year	Number of Civil Servants	Civil Servants per 1000 inhabitants
1950	303,500	3.7
1960	393,000	4.1
1970	515,000	4.4
1980	2,047,000	13.9
1993	4,009,000	21.8

Source: Evers/Schiel 1988, p.236, GOI 1994, p.1188, own calculation

The Law No. 8 (1974) on the Public Personnel forms the legal bases for the civil service, and describes the rights and obligations of civil servants. The law distinguishes three categories of civil servants: central government civil servants, civil servants of the autonomous regional governments, and other civil servants (e.g. local employees of Indonesian embassies abroad, pensioners, civil servants with a limited contract [*ikatan dinas*] (SANRI I:185).

The Indonesian civil service is divided into four service ranks (*golongan*) which are again divided in between four or five grades so that altogether there are 17 service levels: *golongan* Ia-Id, *golongan* IIa- IId, *golongan* IIIa-IIIId, and *golongan* IVa-IVe. For each service level there is a certain educational minimum requirement (see Fig. 17). There is a direct relation of rank and grade with the *eselon* level for those civil service position that are classified as structural positions (*jabatan struktural*), i.e. the higher the *eselon* position, the higher rank and grade of the civil servant.

In terms of positions, the main distinction in the civil service is between structural positions (*jabatan struktural*) and functional positions (*jabatan fungsional*): Structural positions are line management positions in the administration, i.e. the holder of structural positions are the heads of work units in the organisation and supervise directly a certain number of subordinates. Structural positions are general management positions in the sense that their holders can be transferred between various technical fields of work, therefore their holders must fulfil educational requirements only regarding the level of education but not regarding the specific field of education. Functional positions are career positions linked to specific academic and/or technical professions, like medical doctors, computer operators, librarians.

Figure 17: Levels and educational requirements in the Indonesian civil service

Rank	Grade	Name of Position	Eselon level	Minimum educational requirement for entry	Career Path	Career Training (1) Promotional Examination (2) Structural Training
I	a	Juru Muda (Junior Clerk)		Primary School	Ia-IIa	(1) to rank IIa
	b	Juru Muda Tingkat I (First Class Junior Clerk)		Junior High School " (4 years)	Ib-IIc	
	c	Juru (Clerk)		"	Ic-IId	
	d	Juru Tingkat I (First Class Clerk)		"		
II	a	Pengatur Muda (Junior Supervisor)		Senior High School	IIa-IIIa	(1) to rank IIIa
	b	Pengatur Muda Tingkat I (First Class Junior Supervisor)		"		
	c	Pengatur (Supervisor)		"		
	d	Pengatur Tingkat I (First Class Supervisor)	VB	"		
III	a	Penata Muda (Junior Superintendent)	VB/VA	University degree (S1 and higher)	IIIa-IVe	(2) SPAMA (1) to rank IVa
	b	Penata Muda Tingkat I (First Class Junior Superintendent)	VA/IVB	"		
	c	Penata (Superintendent)	IVB/VA	"		
	d	Penata Tingkat I (First Class Superintendent)	IVA/IIIB	"		
IV	a	Pembina (Manager)	IIIB/IIIA	"		(2) SPAMEN
	b	Pembina Tingkat I (First Class Manager)	IIIA/IIIB	"		
	c	Pembina Utama Muda (Junior Administrator)	IIIB/IIA	"		(2) SPATI
	d	Pembina Utama Madya (Middle Administrator)	IIA/IB	"		
	e	Pembina Utama (Senior Administrator)	IB/IA	"		

To be recruited to a functional position, the candidate must fulfil specific technical and/or academic requirements. The transfer to other functional positions is not possible unless the specific requirements of those functional positions are also being met. For each type of positions different career and training paths exist.

Table 10 gives some detailed information on the civil service in terms of gender distribution, ranking, educational background, kind of position, status, and level of government in 1989 and 1994:

Table 10: Size and structure of the civil service (1989 and 1994)

	1989		1994		
	(Number)	%	(Number)	%	Change against 1989 (%)
1. Total number	3,627,615	100.0	3,965,778	100.0	+ 9.3
2. Gender					
a) Male	2,489,159	68.6	2,597,960	65.5	+ 4.4
b) Female	1,138,456	31.4	1,367,818	34.5	+ 20.2
3. Ranking					
- Golongan I	653,443	18.0	520,550	13.1	- 20.3
- Golongan II	2,413,832	66.5	2,578,322	65.0	+ 6.8
- Golongan III	524,878	14.5	826,686	20.8	+ 57.5
- Golongan IV	30,032	0.8	40,220	1.0	+ 33.9
- Other	5,430	0.2	-	-	
4. Education					
- Primary school	599,213	16.5	447,776	11.3	- 25.3
- Secondary school	403,246	11.0	341,564	8.6	- 15.3
- High school	2,121,011	58.5	2,435,669	61.4	+ 14.9
- Bachelor/ Diploma	288,129	8.0	397,334	10.0	+ 37.9
- Master/Ph.D	216,016	6.0	343,435	8.7	+ 58.9
5. Kind of position					
- Structural position	210,111	5.8	157,133	4.0	- 25.2
- Educational position	1,574,365	43.4	1,828,821	46.0	+ 16.2
- Research	2,031	0.1	2,196	0.1	+ 8.1
- Others *	1,841,108	50.8	1,982,626	49.9	+ 7.7
6. Status					
- PNS	2,580,478	71.1	3,377,541	85.2	+30.9
- PNS candidate	1,047,137	28.9	588,237	14.8	-44.1
7. Government level					
- Central government	3,151,661	86.9	3,471,595	87.5	+ 10.2
- Regional governments	475,954	13.1	494,183	12.5	+ 3.8
* includes functional positions (<i>jabatan fungsional</i>)					

Source: GOI 1994, p. 1188 (Table XXII-3)

- Men represented 65.5 percent of the civil servants in 1994, 34.5 percent of the civil servants were women. The latter percentage is slightly lower than the overall share of women in the labour force which was 40 percent in 1990-92 (UNDP 1994:162). Although the number of women in the civil service increased substantially by 20.2 percent during the Repelita V period, they are still under-represented. Especially in the higher *eselon* positions women continue to be a small minority, holding around 6 percent of these positions (World Bank 1993:6).
- Looking at the service levels in the Indonesian civil service in 1994, the biggest share of the civil servants with 65 percent was in the second rank (*golongan II*), while only 1 percent are in the highest rank (*golongan IV*).
- In the same year, more than 60 percent of the civil servants had a higher school qualification (junior or senior secondary school). Only 8.7 percent had a higher university degree (like Master⁽³⁾ or Ph.D), while 10 percent had a lower university degree (Bachelor and Diploma). However, the educational background of civil servants is changing with an increasing emphasis on better qualification and more professionalism: the number of civil servants with university degrees⁽⁴⁾ rose by 37.9 and 58.9 percent, respectively, since 1989, reflecting stronger recruitment in this category. The number of civil servants with primary school education experienced a decrease of around 25 percent, corresponding to the drop of *golongan I* positions in the civil service of around 20 percent.⁽⁵⁾ These pattern indicate "mandated changes in teacher qualifications" as well as a shift towards better qualified civil servants (World Bank 1994:148) in view of the changing focus of government activities from direct implementation to a more policy-making and supporting role.
- In 1994, 4 percent of the civil service positions were classified as structural positions. From 1989 to 1994, the number of structural positions decreased by more than 25 percent. Nearly half of the civil servants hold other positions including functional positions, while 46 percent are in educational positions (like school teachers and academic university staff). The group of the primary school teacher is the largest single occupational group in the civil service. Educational civil service positions increased by more than 16 percent, other positions (including functional positions) by less than 8 percent.
- In 1994, 14.8 percent of the civil servants were classified as candidates (*calon pegawai negeri sipil*), i.e. that their recruitment had not yet been finalized by the government agency in charge of civil service personnel administration, the BAKN.
- Only 12.5 percent of the civil servants were classified as regional government civil servants, while 87.5 percent were employed by the central government.

This figure, however, includes those civil servants who are seconded to autonomous regional governments but whose salary is still covered by the central government's budget. According to data from the BAKN, in 1992 1.67 million civil servants worked directly in central government departments or LPND, while 1.51 million were seconded to regional governments but paid by the central government. Another 232 000 central government civil servants were seconded to and paid by regional governments.

- From 1981 to 1991 the proportion of civil servants posted in Jakarta decreased slightly from 10.9 percent to 9.4 percent, while the proportion of civil servants posted off Java increased from 39.7 percent to 47.3 percent (World Bank 1994a:148), indicating a shift of government activities to the outer provinces of Indonesia.

Around 13 percent of all civil servants were employed by the regional governments in the early 1990s. While the number of central government civil servants increased by more than 10 percent between 1989 and 1994, local government personnel increased by less than 4 percent, a rather low increase in view of the declared policy of the government to shift government tasks to the regional governments. The lower increase of regional government personnel is also apparent when looked at during the 1986-1992 period: while central government personnel increased by more than 26 percent, regional government personnel increased by only 15 percent.⁽⁶⁾

The growth pattern of the civil service was and is linked to the specific political and economic conditions of these periods, and reflects among others changing patterns of state activities. After independence the civil service grew not only because receiving a civil service position was often a reward for active participation in the independence struggle, but also because of the need to expand the scope of the state's activity, resulting in the creation of new central government departments, and because of the creation of new provinces. (Bintoro 1991:79) During the 1960s the numerical expansion of the civil service was caused among others by a re-definition of the civil service category, which now also included educational personnel from the schools and universities.

The rapid expansion of state activities in the 1970s with heavy investment in physical infrastructure and human resources development (like health and education) which became possible by the increase of government revenue from oil and gas resulted in a high growth rate for the civil service due to the recruitment of professional staff like paramedics, medical doctors or engineering personnel. During the 1986 - 1992 period, the central government departments for Health (+ 67.1 percent), Agriculture (+ 47.2 percent), Forestry (+ 168.9 percent), Tourism/Post/Telecommunication (+ 104.2 percent), Transmigration (+ 180.1 percent),

Social affairs (+ 50.5 percent), Cooperatives (+ 758.9 percent) and Public works (+ 32.1) experienced above-average growth rates, reflecting the continuing focus on development-oriented administration, while "classical" departments in the field of general administration (like the departments of home affairs, finance, justice and defense) had moderate and below-average growth rates. A similar picture emerges if looking at the non-departmental central government agencies: those agencies concerned with science and technology (like LIPI, BATAN and BPPT) show also above-average growth rates.⁽⁷⁾

A closer look at the composition of the civil service according to ranks and distribution to the levels of government (Table 11) shows that the lowest civil service rank (*golongan* I) forms a much higher share of the regional government personnel: 29.7 percent of all regional government civil servants (compared with only 13.4 percent of the central government civil servants) fall into this category. On the central as well as on the regional level the *golongan* II civil servants are the strongest category among the respective civil service. While 1 percent of the central government civil servants are in the highest *golongan* IV category, only 0.4 percent of the regional government civil servants fall in this category.

Table 11: Composition of civil service according to ranks and level of government (as of 31 March 1992)

Rank (<i>golongan</i>)	Central Government			Regional Governments			Total	
	(1) Number	(2) %	(3) % of (7)	(4) Number	(5) %	(6) % of (7)	(7) Number (1+4)	(8) % (3+6)
I	464,012	13.4	75.9	147,216	29.7	24.1	611,228	100.0
II	2,374,077	68.7	89.2	286,848	57.8	10.8	2,660,925	100.0
III	579,724	16.8	90.6	60,085	12.1	9.4	639,809	100.0
IV	33,347	1.0	94.3	2,024	0.4	5.7	35,371	100.0
Total*	3,453,901	100.0	87.4	496,225	100.0	12.6	3,950,126	100.0

* includes so-called part-timers not included in the ranks

Source: BAKN

At the local level three categories of civil servants can be found:

- civil servants of the autonomous regional governments (*pegawai negeri sipil daerah*) whose salary is paid from the regional budget (APBD);
- civil servants from the central government who are attached to the regional level but are paid by their central government departments (*pegawai negeri sipil pusat dipekerjakan*);

- civil servants from the central government who are attached to the regional level but are paid by the regional government (*pegawai negeri sipil pusat diperbantukan*).

Expenditure for the civil service constitutes the second largest component in the central government's budget. In the 1994/95 fiscal year, around 46.5 percent of the routine budget expenditures, and 28.2 percent of the total expenditure were allocated for the central government civil service and the personnel component of the SDO. Civil service expenditure (19.675 billion Rupiah) exceeded the Rupiah-financed development expenditure (17.386 billion Rupiah). According to World Bank estimates, 30-40 percent of the development expenditure, which are spent for project benefits and allowances can be added to these figures in order to arrive at the real personnel expenditures (World Bank 1993:21). However, because of the complexity and because of the lack of transparency in the remuneration system (especially regarding the project honoraria), an exact calculation of the government's wage bill is extremely difficult.⁽⁸⁾

4.2 Remuneration and service conditions

As in most countries, the relationship between the state and the civil servant is not determined by individual employment contracts but by legal regulations binding both the state and the civil servant. The relationship is based on the principle of alimentation, in which the state ensures the welfare and well-being of its civil servants, while the civil servants accept their special obligations as "employees" of the state and the government.

The legal basis of the civil service is formulated in Law No. 8 (1974) on the public sector personnel, which defines civil servants as those "who after meeting the preconditions which are determined in the existing regulations, are appointed by the authorised official, and who are entrusted with the tasks in a certain state position." Formerly civil servants held a life-long tenure, however, since 1991 certain professions (like medical doctors and midwives) can also be appointed for a limited term (*pegawai negeri sipil tidak tetap*).

The law defines the **duties** of civil servants as being loyal to *Pancasila*, the 1945 constitution, the state and the government, adhering to all existing regulations, carrying out the official tasks with "dedication, awareness and responsibility", keeping official secrets, and adhering to a list of "do's and do not's" which were specified in the Government Regulation No. 30 (1980) on the discipline of civil servants. Civil servants are regarded as "servants of the state" (*abdi negara*) and "servants of the society" (*abdi masyarakat*).

According to the law, the **rights** of civil servants consists of receiving a salary and getting leave, of getting a promotion, to receive support in case of sickness and

death and to participate in the civil service health and pension insurance schemes. (SANRI I:186f.)

Government Regulation No. 30 (1980) formulates a comprehensive description of the obligations and prohibitions for civil servants (26 *Kewajiban dan 18 Larangan Pegawai Negeri Sipil*), and regulates the system of sanctions and disciplinary measures. The 26 obligations include allegiance and loyalty to *Pancasila*, the 1945 constitution, the state and the government; to give priority to the interest of the state before personal or group interests; to keep official and state secrets; to keep in mind and implement existing regulations; to carry out the official functions as good as possible and with full dedication, consciousness and responsibility, furthermore to provide services to the society as good as possible; to take care and improve the image and integrity of the civil service as a whole; to take care of state property; and to "become a model as citizen of the state who is good in the community" (SANRI I:212f.).

The list of **prohibitions** covers 18 different aspects, for instance the misuse of authority; carrying out of matters detrimental to the honour or the status of the state, the government or the civil service; the misuse and misappropriation of state property; to carry out profit-oriented activities outside the civil service job, or to have shares in an enterprise whose activities are related to the civil service position; and to act as an agent or intermediary for outsiders. (ibid:213f.) Disciplinary measures that can be taken range from oral warnings to complete dismissal from the civil service. As administrative matters, disciplinary measures against civil servants fall under the jurisdiction of the administrative law (PTUN).

The salary structure in the Indonesian civil service is quite complex and lacks transparency and simplicity. Especially non-standardized allowances "form a complex field of various payments which vary across departments and projects. Project allowances are in some cases a major contribution to remuneration for some officials. No comprehensive list of allowances has been produced" (UNDP 1991:57). The complex and varying system of additional bonuses, benefits and allowances, which complement the base salary and which are paid from the development budget, makes it impossible to calculate accurately the actual expenditure of the government for its civil service.

The income of a civil servant consists basically of three elements:

1. the basic salary which is based on the rank and grade of the civil servant
2. various standardized allowances, like rice and family allowances, structural allowances (for holders of structural positions), functional allowances (for holders of functional allowances), and special allowances for civil servants working in remote areas (like East Timor)

3. other salary supplements in cash or kind, like project honoraria, Idul Fitri bonuses, provision of transport to and from the office, housing, daily subsistence allowances for official travel, and medical care.

In the financial year 1995/96, the basic salary of the civil service was increased by around 10 percent. Depending on rank and work experience, a *golongan* I civil servant would earn a base salary of between 86,000 and 230,000 Rupiah (between 39 and 103 US\$), a *golongan* II civil servant between 120,000 and 370,000 Rupiah (55/170 US\$), a *golongan* III civil servant between 165,000 and 470,000 Rupiah (75/210 US\$), and a *golongan* IV civil servant between 185,000 and 590,000 Rupiah (84/270 US\$). While in 1967 the ratio of lowest to highest level of salary was 1:25, this ratio was improved to 1:10 in 1977, and to 1:8 in 1985. With the latest increase, the ratio is around 1:7.

This long awaited salary increase, however, did not result in a substantive improvement of the income situation of civil servants since it compensated only for the loss of purchasing power caused by inflation which was also around 10 percent. It is generally accepted both in Indonesia as well as by international observers (like the World Bank) that the present level of civil service remuneration is not sufficient to cover the cost of living. According to a 1989 study of the government, the salary in the lowest civil service category could statistically cover the cost of living for only 17 days.⁽⁹⁾ The civil service has furthermore suffered from the widening gap between inflation and delayed increases of civil service salaries. According to the World Bank (1994a:148), average real compensation fell slightly between 1984/85 and 1990/91. The precarious situation of the lower income civil servants can also be seen by the fact that even after the salary increase in the 1995/96 fiscal year the daily income of a new civil servant recruit with junior high school certificate (*golongan* I) is below the legal wage minimum set by the government.

Insufficient base salaries, however, have the effect that civil servants first of all concentrate on obtaining additional allowances like project bonuses. Routine activities, which do not attract a bonus, are neglected or are re-formulated to become a project. This "projectism", however, the habit to formulate everything possible as a *proyek* which is eligible to bonuses, jeopardizes the continuity of activities and the completion of work already started, it leads to a rather erratic, incremental and spontaneous way of work which is dictated by the supply of domestic or foreign project funds. It is not seldom that activities come to a standstill as soon as project funds (and project bonuses) have been exhausted.

The experience in many countries shows that insufficient remuneration results in more negative side effects, like "moonlighting", the need to have several jobs, increased incentive for taking illegal surcharges and kickbacks for the provision of standard administrative services (like the issuing of passports or driving licenses),

and a higher rate of corruption. Altogether, the productivity and efficiency of the civil service in Indonesia remain low because of the individual civil servant's need to first of all ensure a sufficient monthly income before he or she can concentrate on work performance and the fulfillment of his responsibilities. Income disparities between the private and the public sector are widening: the income earned by civil servants in Indonesia is just one quarter, or at best one third of what employees of private companies receive.⁽¹⁰⁾ The World Bank (1993) estimates similar wage differences between the civil service and the private sector. Consequently, the civil service is not only unable to attract the better qualified graduates for recruitment, but also loses qualified staff that moves to the more attractive private sector.⁽¹¹⁾ For financial reasons, however, the government has been unable to implement a more comprehensive improvement of the income situation of the civil service.

Although in principle the conditions of service regarding salaries, allowances, working hours etc. are uniform throughout the Indonesian civil service, the regional governments as of now are less able to attract the better qualified personnel. Limited transferability of regional government civil servants (for instance between regional governments, or from the regional government service to a central government institution) and fewer career prospects are the main reasons that the central government service remains more attractive than the service of the regional governments.

4.3 Recruitment and career system

The Indonesian civil service applies a decentralised system of recruitment, i.e. recruitment of new civil servants is done by the individual central government institutions or the regional governments. Usually recruitment decisions are based on written tests and interviews. Although general standards are supposed to be adhered to, in reality "recruitment seems to suffer from the same problems of fragmentation and opaqueness found elsewhere in the Civil Service" (World Bank 1993:13), and system-wide criteria and standards are missing. Recruitment is based on the existing establishment (*formasi*) of the respective institution which describes the number and the ranks of the civil servants, and which should be the result of an analysis of the tasks and work load of the institution. The *formasi* is reflected in the annual budget of the institutions of the central and the regional governments. Recruitment of civil servants has not only to be in accordance with the *formasi*, but must also reflect the actual needs of the institution at the time of recruitment (SANRI I:193). A general weakness in the recruitment process is that only recently job descriptions have been introduced, which allow for a more detailed specification of the skills and knowledge required for a specific position.

An important element to describe the structure of an organisation and to select potential candidates for promotion is the *Daftar Urut Kepangkatan Pegawai*

Negeri Sipil (DUK PNS), a hierarchically organised list of the civil servants of an organisation which is based on the ranks, the position, the work period (seniority), the education and training, and the age of civil servants. In short, the DUK describes the hierarchical structure of the personnel in terms of ranks and seniority, it should serve as a main instrument to decide on promotions and on the filling of vacant positions in an organisation. (SANRI I:208) The decision to fill a vacant position not with the civil servant placed next in the DUK but with another candidate has to be specifically justified.

The Indonesian civil service distinguishes between the so-called "open career system" (*sistem karier terbuka*), i.e. that a vacant position can be filled by anybody who meets the defined requirements, and a "closed career system" (*sistem karier tertutup*) in which a vacant position can be filled only by somebody coming from the respective institution (for instance from the same department or from the same provincial government) (ibid:187f). In general, however, movement between departments and non-departmental agencies, or between the central government and the regional governments is very limited, and most vacant positions are filled with candidates from within the institution. Transfer of personnel within an institution (*mutasi*) does not always take into account training history of the personnel concerned, and is too seldom imbedded in a comprehensive system of institutional manpower planning. Moreover, "the individual has often little control over his own allocation to locations or posts" (UNDP 1991:45).

The civil service has a rather static character (Bintoro 1991:157), with little personnel movement between central government departments and agencies, and even less movement between the central and the regional level or between the regions. There is no system of manpower planning which would determine the human resources composition of the civil service based on an analysis of its tasks and functions, and which would serve as the basis to determine training and education activities.

Promotion and career development of civil servants should be based on a variety of factors, including personal merit (work performance), seniority, work experience, and the fulfillment of certain training requirements in the case of structural and functional positions. To be promoted from one *golongan* to the next higher *golongan* (i.e. for the promotion from Id to IIa, from IIa to IIIa and from IIIa to IVa), the candidates have to pass an official promotional examination (see Fig.17), except in those cases where civil servants have successfully participated in the career development training for structural positions (*diklat struktural*) (SANRI I:203). The President decides on promotions for the level of *eselon* I, while promotions below this level are determined by the respective head of the institution. At the level of the central government, and at the level of the regional

governments advisory committees for promotion in the structural positions (*Badan Pertimbangan Jabatan dan Kepangkatan*) exist. On the national level a similar body has been established in July 1994 to advise the President on promotions for the highest civil service category (*eselon I*).

The main instrument for the performance appraisal of civil servants is the so-called DP3 document (*Daftar Penilaian Pelaksanaan Pekerjaan*). Elements that are evaluated include aspects like attitudes and behaviour, allegiance, responsibility, loyalty, integrity, cooperation, initiative and leadership qualities (SANRI I:207). Performance evaluation should be done annually, and the result of the evaluation is to be reviewed by both the civil servant concerned and the evaluator's supervisor. However, the performance criteria are not specified, and performance is not measured against agreed targets and objectives. "There is usually no appraisal interview, no discussion of individuals' aims and ambitions, and no development plan....the system has minimal influence on performance, allocation of staff, training plans, promotion or individual development." (UNDP 1991:41f.) The reluctance of the Javanese culture to openly criticize poses another problem in valuating staff performance.

4.4 The institutional framework for the civil service

Three central government institutions have tasks and functions relating to the civil service: the Ministry of Administrative Reform (MENPAN), the Civil Service Administration Agency (*Badan Administrasi Kepegawaian Negara* - BAKN), and the National Agency for State Administration (*Lembaga Administrasi Negara* - LAN).

MENPAN (*Menteri Negara Pendayagunaan Apparatur Negara*) has among others the tasks to monitor and improve the efficiency of government institutions. Changes of the organisational structure (creation or abolition of work units), and changes of the establishment (like changes in the number of ranks or of positions) have to be approved by MENPAN. Since 1990, the application for new positions has to be based on a job analysis for these positions.

BAKN was established in 1972, it is the central government agency in charge of personnel administration. While the recruitment of civil servants is done by the individual departments, LPND's and regional governments, BAKN is responsible for handling the appointment procedure, the promotion and the transfer of civil servants. BAKN responsibilities include furthermore the administration of civil service pensions, the maintaining and updating of civil servants' personal data files, the preparation of regulations for civil servants and the control of their implementation (GOI 1991b:115ff.)

LAN is the central government institution in charge of education and training of civil servants, and as such plays a major role in the effort to increase the qualification and attitude of civil servants through pre- and in-service training (see chapter 4.5).

Beside these three institutions, two other central government departments decide in civil service issues: the Department of Finance decides on the overall growth of the civil service, while the Ministry of Home Affairs decides on the allocation of new positions to the provinces following the general agreement on the number of new positions to be created.

The fragmentation of responsibilities and tasks for the various aspects of the civil service, the lack of coordination and of collaboration have resulted in a general absence of an effective civil service management in the sense of applying standardized norms and procedures, of manpower planning and budgeting, career management or of a system-wide professionalisation. "No neutral body, such as a Civil Service Commission (exist) to ensure that system-wide norms and standards are developed in personnel management areas such as recruitment, promotion, appeal or discipline." (World Bank 1993:20) BAKN restricts its activities to record-keeping and personnel administration, while MENPAN lacks executive authority to carry out such management functions, and LAN has responsibility only for the area of training and education. This "vacuum in policy-making and authority" (ibid) has allowed the individual government institutions to develop their own standards and systems, without being held accountable by a superior authority.


4.5 Training and development

Training and education plays a major role in the effort to increase the quality of the Indonesian civil service. However, training and education (*pendidikan dan pelatihan* - *diklat*) aims not only at the improvement of job- and work-related skills and knowledge. Forming the attitudinal and behavioral characteristics of civil servants, and ensuring their political allegiance with the programme of the "New Order"-government has always been an integral part of the human resources development programmes of the government.⁽¹²⁾ The recent Government Regulation No. 14 (1994) on education and training of civil servants describes as the objective of training the improvement of dedication and loyalty of civil servants towards *Pancasila*, the 1945 constitution, the government and the state; the creation of a dynamic, but uniform perception of the tasks of the government; the consolidation of a work attitude based on service to the society, their protection and participation; and the increase of the knowledge, competence and capabilities of the civil servants. According to the regulation, the type of civil servants wanted are civil servants "who are full of allegiance and loyalty towards *Pancasila* and UUD 1945,

the state and the government; and who are unified, have good attitudes and authority; are forceful, effective and efficient; are 'clean',⁽¹³⁾ have high qualities; are aware of their responsibility as elements of the state apparatus, and serve the state and the society" (General Explanation to the PP No. 14/1994).

According to the mentioned Government Regulation, training should be linked to career development and personnel planning. The training process should cover training needs identification, implementation and evaluation of training. Training in the Indonesian civil service can be analyzed under different dimensions as shown in Figure 18, viz. the dimension of status, of career and of tasks.

Figure 18: Dimensions of civil service training



Government Regulation No. 14 (1994) distinguishes two main categories of training: pre-service training (*diklat prajabatan*) and in-service training (*diklat dalam jabatan*): Pre-service training is attended by civil service candidates, it is one of the preconditions for the appointment as civil servant. Duration and content vary with the *golongan* of the candidates. The general objective of pre-service training is to form the mental attitude, readiness and discipline of the future civil servants. Pre-service training is implemented by each government institution based on the curriculum designed by LAN.

In-service training consists of three main categories: structural training (*diklat struktural*), functional training (*diklat fungsional*) and technical training (*diklat teknis*). In addition, there are two more training categories: General administration training (*Diklat Administrasi Umum*), and National Leadership Training (*Diklat Pimpinan Inti*). Each of these training categories has its own characteristics in terms of content, target group, objectives and its link with the career development of the participants (see Figure 18):

- Structural training is a career development training for those civil servants holding structural positions. In order to be eligible for promotion to the *eselon* III, *eselon* II and *eselon* I level, civil servants have to attend the respective training courses (SPAMA for *eselon* III, SPAMEN for *eselon* II and SPATI for *eselon* I). Attendance of these courses is by selection and assignment. Since structural positions are general management positions, the structural training courses cover a broad range of subjects including functional management, general aspects of management and leadership, management techniques, interpersonal and communication skills as well as political and economic issues. The main objective of the training is to increase the management capabilities of the participants, and to build up a cadre for the administrative (and political) leadership of the bureaucracy.
- Functional training is training for the holders of functional positions. Although it has an influence on the career development of the respective civil servants, its main purpose is to increase the knowledge in the respective professional field. Functional training is differentiated depending on whether it aims at improving the general competence and knowledge of the participants (*diklat fungsional keahlian*), or whether it aims at the improvement of specific skills (*diklat fungsional ketrampilan*). Functional training can also be attended by holders of structural positions, if the functions of the structural position require that specific knowledge.
- Technical training is related to the immediate tasks of a civil service position, irrespective whether it is a structural or functional position. While technical training linked to the direct job assignment (*diklat teknis substantif*) is implemented by the individual government institution, general technical training (*diklat teknis umum*) (e.g. in project management, job analysis) is implemented centrally by LAN. Technical training covers a very broad range of topics, a survey of LAN in 1992/93 identified more than 1800 different technical training courses in the central and regional civil service.⁽¹⁴⁾
- General Administration training is a preparatory administrative and management training for those civil servants who are being promoted to the structural positions of *eselon* V and IV level. The main purpose is to provide the

participants with basic managerial capabilities (like integrated work planning) and administrative skills.

- The National Leadership Training is a new training course for holders of *eselon* I positions, its main purpose is to broaden the political and administrative perception of these most senior civil servants, to increase their understanding of government policies and of the factors influencing the policy-making of the government.

Figure 19: Main training concepts in the Indonesian civil service

	Structural training (<i>diklat struktural</i>)	Functional training/ training in functional positions (<i>diklat fungsional</i>)	Technical training (<i>diklat teknis</i>)	General Administration training (<i>Diklat Administrasi Umum</i>)
Dimension	Hierarchy, Career	Profession, Task	Task	Hierarchy, Career
Content	Management skills	Professional knowledge	Tasks-related skills and knowledge	Knowledge in general management and administration
Objective	To improve general managerial capability	To improve knowledge in one's profession	To improve skills and knowledge related to one's tasks	To provide basic knowledge in administration and management
Target group	Holders of general management positions (<i>jabatan struktural</i>)	Holders of a functional position (<i>jabatan fungsional</i>)	All staff	Candidates for <i>eselon</i> V/IV positions
Relation to career development	Direct (Precondition for promotion)	Indirect (performance improvement)	Indirect (performance improvement)	Direct (precondition for promotion/ appointment)

In each institution a curriculum team is set up to provide ideas and suggestions for the training programmes of the respective institution. At the national level, a National Curriculum Team is established by the head of LAN to advise on training programmes, curricula, methodologies and other matters related to training. While the majority of training programmes is done in the classical way, i.e. in the forms of training courses, seminars and workshops, LAN has started efforts to introduce non-classical forms of training like long-distance learning.

In the planning and implementation of training programmes, the *widyaiswara* ("functional trainers") play a central role in the development of training concepts, the design of curricula, the preparation of training materials and the actual process

of teaching. *Widyaiswara* are full-time trainers with specific professional background. It is a functional position with its own career path whose main tasks lie in training and education. As of May 1993, there were more than 1800 *widyaiswara* in the Indonesian civil service.

The institutional framework for training in the civil service is complex and fragmented. LAN is the main central government agency in charge of all matters related to training and education of civil servants. As so-called *lembaga pembina* (lit. "developing institution"), LAN is responsible for the coordination, implementation, control, supervision, and development of training. LAN decides on the curricula of the pre-service training, the general administration training, the PIMTI training and the structural training. It is the only government institution that is allowed to implement the PIMTI, SPAMEN and SPATI courses. To cater for the higher education needs of the civil service, LAN's organisation includes the School for Administrative Science (*Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Administrasi* - STIA) which offers degree courses in public administration and business administration, and non-degree courses in a wide range of subjects.

Beside LAN, each department or central government agency, and each regional government has its own training units (*badan diklat* or *pusat diklat*) with an often substantial training infrastructure, as in the case of the large departments like the Ministry of Home Affairs (which caters also for the training needs of the sub-national level of administration), the Department of Finance, or the Department of Agriculture. The Ministry of Home Affairs e.g. has its own Institute of Government Studies, a higher education institute for public administration, and a National College of Local Government (*Sekolah Tinggi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri* - STPDN) which was created in 1989 by merging 20 provincial academies of the DDN in order to train the ministry's staff for the lower level of the *wilayah* administration at the *kecamatan* and *kelurahan* level. The Department of Finance has a Graduate School for Public Accountants, the Department of Public Works runs its LPPU which provide technical education up to the Diploma-level, and the Department of Agriculture has 10 training institutes offering programmes on varying levels. Clashes of competence, and institutional power play between LAN and these line ministries do occur.

During the Repelita V Period (April 1989 - March 1994), 82,828 civil service candidates participated in pre-service training, 50,669 civil servants participated in the various *diklat struktural* programmes, and around 173,000 in non-structural training programmes (GOI 1994:1193f.). While the structural training is funded by the routine budget, many of the non-structural programmes are funded from the development budget. Accumulated figures for the financial allocation of the government for training purposes are not available.

An important aspect of training in the civil service is overseas training, either funded by Indonesian sources or by national and international donors. According to World Bank figures, during 1985-1987 960 master level and 217 doctoral level fellowships were awarded by bilateral donors. During 1976-1988, the World Bank alone funded 1197 in-country and 2360 overseas fellowships on the masters level, and 108 in-country and 1051 overseas fellowships at the doctoral level. From 1989-1993, the World Bank funded 1883 degree and 805 non-degree fellowships (World Bank 1993:17). While Indonesia suffers less from a brain-drain than other developing countries, fellows returning from overseas face difficulties in being allocated into the right positions, a problem particularly apparent in the technology-oriented agencies like BPPT and BATAN.

Although human resources development for the civil service has received much attention from the government because of the importance attached to the role of the administration in the development process, a major weakness of these human resources development efforts has been the lack of linkage between training and personnel planning, both on a system-wide level (manpower planning) and on an individual level (career planning). Training and education is too often "supply-driven", i.e. based on the availability of funds rather than an analysis of individual or institutional training needs. The improvement of work-related skills and knowledge is furthermore only one rationale for training: training might as well be regarded as a non-monetary reward, especially if the training takes place abroad. If staff members, after their return from training, are moved to another position not connected with the training they received, the impact of this training is made negligible. Too often training is not seen as only one means in the process of human resources development that interacts with other means to become successful, but is regarded as an end in itself (World Bank 1993:15).

4.6 The culture of the civil service

The culture of an organisation can be defined as the set of values, attitudes, norms, shared beliefs and mental orientations that shape and determine the behaviour and expectations of the members of that organisation. The organisational culture has an internal effect by stimulating cooperation of the organisation's members, by strengthening the feeling of togetherness and by unifying them in pursuing the objectives of the organisation. Organisational culture has furthermore an external effect by creating an image of the organisation for non-members, by influencing the perception and attitude by which the organisation is viewed and judged from outside.

Organisational culture can be created, influenced and changed by various means: mission statements define the objectives of the organisation and thus help to create a joint understanding of the purpose of the organisation. The formulation of leadership principles can determine leadership styles and the roles and mutual

relationship of subordinates and superiors. The formal structure of an organisation determines among others the number of hierarchical levels; this and the working procedures influence the scope of individual authority and decision-making. The system of rewards and sanctions, symbolic forms of communication, dress-codes - all these aspects come together to create the culture of the organisation.

Although the Indonesian civil servants work in various institutions which might have an organisational culture of their own, they nevertheless share common features of a service-wide culture whose determining factors derive from the history and tradition of the country and its regions, the level of economic development and the prevailing political situation. Some of the influencing factors have already been mentioned above (see Introduction), like the traditional Javanese concepts of power, hierarchy and conflict solution, the role of the *priyayi*, the development orientation of the state, and the need to guarantee the territorial unity of the country. In the following the culture of the Indonesian civil service is described in more detail.

According to the Law No. 8 (1974) on the Public Sector Personnel, civil servants are regarded as *abdi negara* ("servant of the state") and *abdi masyarakat* ("servant of the society"). In its effort to consolidate its political and administrative strength, the "New Order"-government during its first decades emphasized the *abdi negara* - aspect, and less the *abdi masyarakat* - aspect which would imply that the people have a stronger influence on the activities of the administration. The resulting hierarchical relationship between the administration and the society was characterized by the administration's paternalistic attitude and a centralisation of power. The high prestige and the social status connected with a civil service position reinforced such a paternalistic attitude (which could be found already in the *priyayi* - culture) ⁽¹⁵⁾, in which the execution and implementation of policies and regulations as determined by the government from above took place without questions and without participation of the people concerned. The civil service regards itself as the main instrument to foster and lead economic and social development.

The traditional top-down approach of the bureaucracy towards the society is reflected in the internal structures of the service with their emphasis on top-down decision-making, seniority and centralisation of power. Initiative from below is lacking, the scope for decision-making at the lower levels is limited because of little delegation of authority. Emphasis on seniority instead of performance and qualification tends to reduce the problem-solving capacity of the service, and reduces effectiveness and efficiency.

Only in recent years has the government begun to stress the aspect of *abdi masyarakat*, the idea that civil servants are not superior to the public but have to serve the people, have to listen to their aspirations, and have to involve them in the

decisions of the administration. Such a change of attitude would among others require that the civil service succeeds in overcoming its relative isolation from other sector of the society (which for instance can be seen in the absence of personnel transfers between the private and the public sector), and opens up new channels of communication with the society.

Another aspect of the organisational culture of the civil service which reflects its specific Javanese heritage is the tendency to avoid open criticism, the preference for consensus and harmony, the importance of oral communication as compared to written communication, and the importance of personal relationships as compared to functional relationships (MacAndrews 1986b:30ff.). The civil service as part of the system of government has in many aspects a typical prismatic character where beneath the clearly-structured surface other, less obvious structures and elements exist: "If one looks at the Indonesian system of government...one is acutely aware that beneath the formal structure of government that appears logical and rational, there are a wide range of complex personal relationships and connections that determine to a great extent decision-making, and ultimately, how the government perform" (ibid:32). Personal relationships in the bureaucracy exist not only because of family connections or because of a common ethnic or religious background. The graduation from the same university, for example, or participation in the same training courses (like the structural training courses, or the National Leadership Course organised by the LEMHANAS, the National Defense Institute, for military and civilian public personnel) are important contact points where civil servants can establish crucial social and working relationships across the institutional borders.

In the post-1966 period, two major groups or currents have often been mentioned in connection with the decision- and policy-making in the civil service: the "Berkeley Mafia" and the Gadjah Mada Group (ibid: 34). The first one refers to those senior civil servants and policy advisors that influenced the economic and financial policy of the "New Order"-government, and who had often studied abroad. This group was said to dominate for instance the Department of Finance, the central bank and BAPPENAS. The second group refers to graduates from the prestigious Indonesian universities (like the Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, Universitas Indonesia in Jakarta, or Universitas Padjadjaran in Bandung), who were said to have a more inward-looking, traditional orientation, and were dominating e.g. the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the apparatus' of the regional governments. Such a two-sided distinction, however, might be outdated by now in view of the diversification processes in the service in terms of interests and educational background. Nevertheless, networks based on university graduation and training courses continue to be an important "lubricant" for the functioning of the administration.

The "mission" of the civil service, its purpose and its objectives are laid down in a very general form in the Indonesian constitution and in the state philosophy *Pancasila*. In order to ensure that the interpretation of both confirms with the official interpretation as put forward by the "New Order"-government, ideological education of civil servants is an integral part of civil service training. Since 1978 civil servants are obliged to attend the P4 course of the *Pancasila*-agency BP7, which has become a constituent element of both pre-service training and the structural training for civil service management positions. In a more symbolic form allegiance to the state and *Pancasila* is pledged in a flag-rising ceremony carried out by each government institution on the 17th of each month in order to celebrate the date of the declaration of independence, during which the five principles of the *Pancasila* are recited.

The civil service organisation KORPRI (*Korps Pegawai Negeri Republik Indonesia*) is an important element in the culture of the civil service. KORPRI is "an umbrella organisation to gather and develop the entire civil service ... outside the official duties, in order to increase its dedication in the fulfilling of the independence and in the implementation of development" (SANRI I:230). All members of KORPRI have to follow the ethics code of KORPRI, the *Sapta Prasetya*, which includes allegiance to *Pancasila* and the UUD 1945; a commitment to national unity, welfare of the society and solidarity with KORPRI; a pledge to be honest, not to favour private or group interests, and to keep official secrets; and the commitment to develop one's own knowledge and capabilities.

KORPRI was established in 1971 "to prevent civil servants (being) divided into ideological, political groups, in order to improve (the) services the civil servants render to the public" (GOI 1991c:451). KORPRI was a response of the "New Order"-government to the political division and fragmentation of the civil service during the last years of the "Old Order"-government when affiliation of civil servants with the political parties was rampant, and political bickering reduced the productivity and efficiency of the public sector. By unifying all public sector personnel in one organisation (membership in KORPRI is compulsory for each civil servants and employees of public enterprises, and membership fees are automatically deducted from the salary), the "New Order"-government could more easily control and influence the civil service as a substantial portion of the total work force. The function of KORPRI is less in the immediate work sphere of the civil servants but in influencing their life outside the work, e.g. by organising the distribution of rice and food allowances, and by planning out-of-work activities.

KORPRI has a political function as well, since it is the biggest single functional group that constitutes GOLKAR. Formerly KORPRI members became automatically members of GOLKAR, thus ensuring that a substantial bloc of votes would

go to the government's party. KORPRI was and is the main source of political cadres and party activists for GOLKAR. Although in principle civil servants can become members of the other existing political parties after obtaining the permission from their superiors, the concept of "mono-loyalty" towards GOLKAR as the party of the government continues to form a central element of the civil service culture.

Introduced in the early 1970s, "mono-loyalty" has been re-confirmed in recent years by leading political and administrative figures like the former Minister for Home Affairs, Rudini,⁽¹⁶⁾ his successor, Yogie,⁽¹⁷⁾ the chairman of KORPRI and Secretary-General of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Suryatna Subrata (who was reported as saying that "it will be a long time before KORPRI decides to allow its members to vote according to their choice")⁽¹⁸⁾, and the Director-General for Social and Political Affairs of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Soetojo.⁽¹⁹⁾

One of the major features of the organisational culture not only of the public sector, but also of the private sector is the *keluarga besar* concept⁽²⁰⁾ which views the staff of an organisation as one big family which share common purposes, and friendly, familiar relationships. The celebration of an institution's anniversary, sport events, joint trips by the staff, sometimes the provision of dresses support the feeling of belonging together. Such activities are often planned and carried out by KORPRI.

Another organisation that tends to bridge the gap between the work sphere and private life is the organisation of the civil servants' wives, the *Dharma Wanita*. Founded in 1974, its official purpose is to improve the welfare of the members through activities at home and outside their homes. *Dharma Wanita* operates schools, carries out social development activities, and tries to improve skills and knowledge of the members by means of discussion and training. The organisation has been criticized as undemocratic because the status of the members reflects the status of the husbands, and because membership is compulsory. The focus of activities was criticized because they would perpetuate the "domestication" of women but not assist them in achieving a more equal role in the public life. Low attendance at meetings, budgetary problems and the centralised decision-making process in which the central board plans national programmes which have to be implemented by the local branches, reduce the efficiency of the organisation.⁽²¹⁾

Part of the culture of the civil service is the need to complement the official salary by having a second job. Absenteeism from the work place is high, and even if civil servants are at their work place it does not necessarily mean that they work for the government: they might as well use their government-paid working time to prepare for another job, like teaching, doing consultancy work, or carrying out a small research project. Since most civil servants are more or less effected by the insufficient salary level, the effects of this "moonlighting" on the effectiveness and productivity of the organisation are more or less accepted by the others.

4.7 Civil service reform

For several years now the government has been implementing measures to make the civil service more effective and efficient, to reduce corruption, and to accommodate the effects of the policies of deregulation, decentralisation and debureaucratisation. In the words of the GBHN 1993: "Promotion of the civil service is aimed at creating a viable state civil service through career development on the basis of working achievement, professional ability, expertise and skill. Along with a viable mental attitude of the state apparatus based on *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution (the service) should be improved continuously and according to plan through education and training, assignment, guidance and consultation, as well as through promotion of motivation, code of etiquette, discipline of service which are sound and supported by a viable personnel information system and completed with an appropriate merit system." (GOI 1993:116)

In order to improve the quality and the professionalism of the civil service, recruitment of new civil servants concentrated on candidates with university degrees. Although the Indonesian civil service is not oversized compared with other countries (it is more the composition, the skills mix and the allocation of civil servants that is the problem), there is a tendency to reduce the size of the service (Salomoen 1993:42), and new recruitment now just replenish civil servants that leave the service. Since 1991 certain professions can become civil servants on a temporary basis (e.g. medical doctors and midwives).

In the framework of the overall reform of the administrative structure as formulated in the eight "priority programmes" of MENPAN,⁽²²⁾ the reform of the civil service so far concentrated above all on two areas: the creation of new functional positions, and on job analysis.

- a) New functional positions have been created in order to make the service more professional and expertise-oriented. At the end of Repelita V (1994), 52 functional positions had been developed (GOI 1994: 1160), ranging from medical doctor to forestry technician and tax controller (see Annex). For each of these positions recruitment criteria, performance criteria and a career development path had been established, and a specific government institution has been identified as *lembaga pembina*, i.e. as developing institution to handle the technical and professional aspects of this functional position. Promotion in functional positions, and the payment of functional allowances is based on the accumulation of credit points based on knowledge, the actual work performance during a certain period of time and professional development (training). The system of credit points will give civil servants the opportunity to be promoted faster if their work performance is higher. If fully operational, the 52 functional positions will cover more than 2 million of the civil servants

(including the approximately 1.6 million teachers of the Department of Education and Culture).

Some shortcomings of the system of functional positions have still to be tackled, among them the administrative workload connected with the accreditation of credit points and the recording of work performances, the focus on quantity instead of quality of work as criteria for the allocation of credit points and other operational problems of the credit point system (World Bank 1993: 60ff.). Moreover, not all functional positions have already secured the required funding, i.e. the provision of allowances. Another long-term effect of functional positions which has not been addressed yet is the risk of increased personnel costs for an institution since the career path of functional positions (i.e. the possibility for promotion) is not linked to a specific number of positions in an institution but only to individual performance.

- b) The introduction of job analysis was the second major initiative to make the civil service more effective and efficient. By implementing job analysis throughout the civil service since 1990, the government expected to be able to develop specific job description, a better specification of tasks and responsibilities for each position, and to improve the match between staff qualification and the requirements for a position. However, job analysis has as of now not yet been integrated into a functional review of the respective government agency as a whole, and the development of job descriptions has not been done satisfactorily. According to the World Bank, "while the actual analysis has reportedly been completed in some 95 percent of the departments and agencies, including at the regional level, there is little indication that the information gathered has been used for any useful purpose." (World Bank 1993:32)

One aspect that has not yet been addressed sufficiently in the process of reforming and modernising the civil service are the long-term effects of the deregulation and debureaucratisation policy which will result in a new relationship of private and public sector, and which will change the role and the functions of the government and its apparatus, including the personnel. The removal of licensing and control function, the reduction of direct interventions of the government in the provision and distribution of goods and services, the strengthened role of the private sector in economic development, the need for the government apparatus to assume a more indirect, supporting role for private sector initiative - these trends will result in the need to review functions and tasks of institutions, and to redefine qualifications of the staff working in these institutions. Areas of skills that will be more important in the future include analytical skills, policy-making skills, the improvement of legal drafting in order to reduce ambiguity of legal regulations, the ability to monitor policy implementation, competence in data-gathering and data analysis, financial

analysis, computer skills, and others. The long-term improvement of the civil service can be carried out only in this framework of a general review of the role, structure and function of the public administration system.

Notes

1. Beside the civil servants, two other categories of public personnel exist in Indonesia: state officials (*pejabat negara*) holding political public functions (like the president, the ministers, the members of MPR/DPR, the *Kepala Daerah*), and the members of the armed forces and the police (SANRI I:183ff). This chapter will deal only with the civil service, i.e. the PNS.
2. See Annex, Table VII.
3. These include the Indonesian university degrees of Sarjana 1 (S1) and Sarjana 2 (S2).
4. The largest single groups of academic degrees in the civil service in 1992 were degrees in agriculture, medicine, law and degrees of teacher colleges (see Annex, Table VI).
5. Since 1993 the government has completely stopped recruitment for *golongan I* positions.
6. See Annex, Table VII.
7. The only department suffering a substantial decrease of staff was the Dept. of Trade which lost personnel following the economic deregulation policy which began in the early 1980s.
8. See also Annex, Table X.
9. *Jakarta Post* 11 November 1992.
10. Prijono Tjiptoheriyanto, Efforts towards clean, respected government, in: *Jakarta Post* 17 March 1995.
11. The brain-drain from the civil service to the private sector is above all felt in those areas where skills and knowledge of civil servants are easily usable for the private sector, like in accounting, science and technology. Government institutions like BPPT, BPK, LIPI and BATAN are reported to have suffered from the loss of qualified personnel to the private sector (*Jakarta Post*, 4 April 1993).

12. For instance a decree of the MPR in 1978 obliged all civil servants to be trained in the realisation and implementation of *Pancasila*, and to follow the P4-course of the BP7 (Thoolen 1987:37).
13. "Bersih"; meaning "not corrupt", "adhering to the regulations".
14. See LAN, Lampiran Penyelenggaraan Diklat Teknis-Fungsional oleh Instansi Pemerintah Tahun 1992/93, Jakarta, 1993.
15. The *priyayi* were the administrators for the ruling class of the Javanese society and were often from noble origin. During the Dutch rule, they became the backbone of the Inheemsche Bestuur, ruling their people on the basis of the Dutch laws and regulations. After independence, they formed the initial public administration of the republic. The *priyayi*-culture of administration is patrimonial and paternalistic, stressing social hierarchy, and the distance between those in power and those being governed (see Bintoro 1991:132ff.).
16. *Jakarta Post* 3 December 1993.
17. *Jakarta Post* 14 April 1994.
18. *Jakarta Post* 1 December 1993.
19. *Indonesian Observer* 26 November 1993.
20. Literally "big family".
21. See *Indonesian Observer* 25 September 1994: "Dharma Wanita - the organisation of the civil servants' wives".
22. The eight priority programmes of MENPAN include;
 1. Improved Internal Management Control,
 2. Application of Job Analysis,
 3. Development of Functional Positions,
 4. Improved Quality of Leader,
 5. Simplification of Civil Service Procedures,
 6. Improved Management of Public Service,
 7. Design of Management Information System, and
 8. Improved Processes Leading to Autonomy at the Dati II level.